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CASE COMMENTS
arbitrary and unreasonable classifications. In light of the fact
that common-law marriages have recently been abolished in Indiana,
it seems safe to infer that the decision in the final appeal would have
been different if the law of Indiana had not been changed prior to
the rendering of this decision.4 0
WILuAm H. ABELOFF
SIGNIFICANCE OF PUBERTY IN NONAGE MARRIAGES
Statutes in every state have raised the age required at common
law to contract a valid marriage.1 Originally this was the age of
puberty, 12 years for the female and 14 years for the male.2 By thus
raising the required age, legislatures have created a gap between the age
at which the parties are deemed to have physical capacity to consum-
mate a marriage and the age required by statute for legal capacity to
contract a valid marriage. A nonage marriage in which one of the
parties has reached the age of puberty but not the age required by
statute could be held to be either: (i) valid, (2) voidable, (3) or void.
Arkansas has had difficulty in dealing with this type of marriage.
State v. Graves,3 the most recent Arkansas case involving nonage mar-
riages, points up this problem. An Arkansas statute provides that
males of the age of 18 and females of the age of 16 years "shall be
capable in law of contracting marriage; if under these ages, their
marriages shall be absolutely void."4 Harold Graves, 17 years of age,
and Sandra Spearman, 13 years of age, both residents of Arkansas, went
to Mississippi to get married. They were accompanied by the parents
of the girl and the father of the boy. After the ceremony, the group
returned to Arkansas, where the defendant and Sandra had lived as
man and wife for a period of four days when an attendance officer
at Sandra's school obtained a warrant charging Harold and Mr. and
'Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245 U.S. 412, 417 (1918).
'I Vernier, American Family Laws § 29, at 116 (1931). This section says that ii
jurisdictions retain the common law age requirement. However, in the 1938 sup-
plement to this treatise, § 29 says that 6 of the 11 states, have, by statute, raised the
age required at common law. Vernier, American Family Laws § 29 (Supp. 1938). At
the time of this writing the remaining 5 states, adhering to the common law rule in
1938, have raised the age required to contract unconditionally a valid marriage. Idaho
Code § 32-202 (x947); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ch. 66, § 5 (1954); Md. Ann. Code art.
62, § 9 (1957); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 207, § 7 (1955); Miss. Code Ann. § 46o (1942).
2Keezer, Marriage and Divorce §145 at 203 (3d ed. 1946).
3307 S.W.2d 545 (Ark. 1957).
'Ark. Stat. Ann. § 55-1o2 (1947).
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Mrs. Spearman with contributing to the delinquency of a minor.5
The prosecution reasoned that the Mississippi mariage was void, and
thus Sandra had been delinquent because of her cohabitation with
the defendant. In deciding the guilt or innocence of the defendant,
the court necessarily determined the validity of the marriage. The
court held the marriage was not void, stating, "We have no statute
which provides that marriages such as the one involved here.., are
void in the state of Arkansas." 6 This decision was based on the con-
flict of laws principle that a marriage valid where performed is valid
everywhere.7 As a result of this determination that the marriage
was not void, the charge of contributory delinquency against the de-
fendant was dismissed. Chief Judge Harris wrote a strong dissent
saying that if a marriage by parties under the statutory age require-
ment was "absolutely void," it could not be valid under any cir-
cumstances.
"Prior to 1941 the Arkansas statute provided that nonage mar-
riages "are void."8 In cases involving nonage marriages the court, how-
ever, interpreted this statute to mean such marriages are voidable only,
not void ab initio.9 In 1941 the legislature amended the statute by
inserting the word "absolutely" before the word "void."' 0 In a 1944
case this amendment, though mentioned in the court's opinion, was
ignored in determining a nonage marriage to be voidable only and
not void ab initio1n
In 1945 the case of Ragan v. Cox12 came before the Arkansas court.
This case involved the marriage of a twelve-year-old girl to her fifty-
two-year-old uncle. While holding this marriage void on the ground
that it was incestuous, the court, in dictum, said that on the ground
of nonage alone the marriage would not be void, but merely voidable i s
On remand evidence was introduced showing the man was not the
girl's uncle, but her great-uncle. Therefore the parties to the marriage
were not within the degree of relationship prohibited by the statute.
gThe opinion gives no explanation as to why D. H. Graves, defendant's father,
who also accompanied the group to Mississippi and consented to the marriage, was
not included in the warrant.
63o7 S.W.2d at 550.
7Restatement, Conflict of Laws § z~i (934).
8Ark. Rev. Stat. ch. 94, § 2 (1837) as cited in 3o7 S.W.2d at 549.
*Witherington v. Witherington, 2oo Ark. 8o2, 141 S.W.2d 3o (i4o); Kibler v.
Kibler, i8o Ark. 1152, 24 S.W.zd 867 (1930).
MArk. Acts 1941, Act 32.
'Hood v. Hood, 2o6 Ark. 1057,r178 S.W. 670 (1944).
2o8 Ark. 8o9, 187 S.W.gd 874 (1945).
2Id. at 876.
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Because of this new evidence the Supreme Court on the second ap-
peal was unable to hold the marriage void on the ground of incest,
and therefore held it void on the ground of nonage.14 In the opinion
the court stated, "If we are at liberty to say that a man who has passed
the half century mark may fraudulently procure a marriage license, and
in consummation of lust induce a justice of the peace to intone the
phrases that in more favorable circumstances would result in mar-
riage-if this can be done with a twelve-year-old girl, it can be carried
still further and serve to unite an octogenarian with a female child
appropriated from the play room...."1' This language seems to in-
dicate that the peculiar facts of the case influenced the court to hold
this marriage void because the relationship was shocking to the court's
conscience. In the Ragan case the attack on the marriage was at the
instance of the nonage party. The fact that a nonage party may attack
a void or voidable marriage and a party who is of the age of legal
consent may only attack a void marriage16 leaves some question as to
whether the court would have held the marriage void if the nonage
party was asserting the validity of the marriage. This is evidenced
by the following language of the court: "In the circumstances of this
case the pretended marriage between W. A. and Louise Ragan was-
certainly as to the appellee [great-uncle] ... a complete nullity. What
effect the ceremony might have had upon any marriage status claimed
by Louise does not enter into the discussion, because at her instance
the records were purged."'17 Therefore, it cannot be said with cer-
tainty whether the court determined this marriage to be void or merely
voidable.
The dissent in State v. Graves appears to be arguing for the in-
clusion of nonage marriages within section 13 2(d) of the Restatement
of the Conflict of Laws which sets out an exception to the principle
that a marriage valid where performed is valid everywhere by in-
validating a "marriage of a domiciliary which a statute at the
domicil makes void though celebrated in another state."'-8 Adoption
of the view proposed by the dissent would have the same effect as
"'Ragan v. Cox, 21o Ark. 152, 194 S.W.2d 681 (x946).
11d. at 685.
"Keezer, Marriage and Divorce § 144 (3d ed. 1946).
1794 S.W.2d at 685.
"Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 132(d) (1934). The dissenting judge states:
"I feel that this Court should go further and add a fifth exception, namely, 'mar-
riage of a domicilary which the statute at the domicile makes void.'" Though the
dissent states that "a fifth exception" should be added, he uses language that is
the same as that of the fourth exception as stated in the Restatement, except for
omitting the phrase, "though celebrated in another state." 3o7 S.W.2d at 551.
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legislative adoption of a marriage evasion statute. Such a statute
invalidates a marriage of a domiciliary contracted without the state
for the purpose of evading the laws of domicile.19 It seems to be
going too far to say the legislature intended the words "absolutely
void" to have the effect of a marriage evasion statute when such a
statute could have as easily been enacted.
If it had been the intent of the legislature to make all nonage
marriages void ab initio, instead of merely voidable, then it seems
pointless for the state to have another statute providing for annul-
ment on the ground of want of age.20 The wording of other statutes
also leaves doubt as to what the legislature intended by "absolutely
void." The statute dealing with miscegenatious marriages provides
that such marriages are "illegal and void."' 21 The statute dealing with
marriages between persons within prohibited degrees of consanguinity
provides that such marriages are "incestuous and absolutely void."
22
Miscegenatious and incestuous marriages fall within the recognized
exceptions to the conflict of laws principle that a marriage valid where
performed is valid everywhere.23 It seems the legislature would have
characterized nonage marriages with similar language, i.e., "illegal and
absolutely void," so as to show a strong public policy against such
marriages if it intended that these marriages should be void ab initio
as are miscegenatious and incestuous marriages.
The majority opinion in State v. Graves, in determining that the
marriage was not void, is consonant with prior decisions of the Ar-
kansas courts, 24 with the exception of the second appeal in the
Regan case:25 The decision also seems to be in accord with a majority
of other jurisdictions.26 Although all states have raised the common law
"Restatement, Conflict of Laws § 132, comment c (934). Massachusetts has a
typical marriage evasion act that provides, "If any person residing and intending
to continue to reside in this commonwealth is disabled or prohibited from contract-
ing marriage under the laws of this commonwealth and goes into another jurisdic-
tion and there contracts a marriage prohibited and declared void by the laws of
this commonwealth, such marriage shall be null and void for all purposes in this
commonwealth with the same effect as though such prohibited marriage had been
entered into in this commonwealth." Mass. Ann. Laws Ch. 207, § 10 (1955).
"Ark. Stat. Ann. § 55-1o6 (1947)-
" Ark. Stat. Ann. § 55-104 (1947). (Emphasis added).
"Ark. Stat. Ann. § 55-103 (1947). (Emphasis added).
Restatement, Conflict of Laws §§ 121, 132 (1934).
"Ragan v. Cox, 208 Ark. 8o9, 187 S.W.2d 874 (1945); Hood v. Hood, 2o6 Ark.
1057, 178 S.W.2d 670 (1944); Witherington v. Witherington, 2oo Ark. 802, 141 S.W.2d
30 (194o); Kibler v. Kibler, i8o Ark. 1152, 24 S.W.2d 867 (1930).
2194 S.W.2d at 681.
-Taylor v. Taylor, 249 Ala. 419, 31 So. 2d 579 (1947); Smith v. Smith, 2o5 Ala.
502, 88 So. 577 (1921); People v. Souleotes, 26 Cal. App. 3o9, 146 Pac. 9o3 (1915);
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age requirements, many courts hold marriages by parties under the
statutory age voidable rather than void.28 Only three of the seventeen
jurisdictions searched follow the strict statutory interpretation of
minimum age requirements, advocated by the dissent in the principal
case. -0 These three jurisdictions, however, have raised the age limits
only slightly.30 For example, in Hayes v. Hay,3 1  the Georgia court,
by strictly construing the statute providing that a girl must be four-
teen years of age to contract marriage,3 2 held the marriage of a twelve-
year-old girl to be void. New Hampshire has retained the common
law age of 14 for males, while raising the age for females from 12 to
13 .33
The so-called age of consent, as it existed at common law, was
closely related to a person's physical capacity to enter into the mar-
riage state. By raising this age, modern statutes have created an age
of consent that is unrelated to physical development and rests solely
on public policy as interpreted by the legislature. When persons who
have reached the age of puberty, but not that of legal consent, never-
theless undertake to contract a marriage, what will be its effect? The
answer the courts generally give is that the marriage is voidable. By
interpreting such marriages as voidable, the courts have raised the
age span at which a marriage was voidable at common law, [7-14 for
In re Kemp, 192 Misc. 267, 78 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y. County 1948);
Anonymous v. Anonymous, 176 Misc. 850, 29 N.Y.S.2d 331 (Dom. Rel. Ct. N.Y.
County 1941); Parks v. Parks, ai8 N.C. 245, to S.E.2d 807 (1940); Sawyer v. Slack,
196 N.C. 697, 146 S.E. 864 (1929); Keith v. Pack, 182 Tenn. 420, 187 S.W.2d 618
(1945); Needham v. Needham, 183 Va. 681, 33 S.E.2d 288 (1945); Kirby v. Gilliam,
182 Va. 111, 28 S.E.2d 40 (1943).
21See note i supra.
OSee note 24 supra. The requirement of parental consent for nonage parties
will not be discussed in this article. For discussion of this issue see Kingsley, The
Law of Infants' Marriages, 9 Vand. L. Rev. 593 (1956).
'Hayes v. Hay, 92 Ga. App. 88, 88 S.E.2d 3o6 (1955); Mims v. Hardware Mut.
Cas. Co., 82 Ga. App. 21O, 6o S.E.2d 501 (195o); Powell v. Powell, 97 N.H. 3o,
86 A.2d 331 (1952); Ex parte Tucker, 219 P.2d 245 (Okla. Crim. App. 1950); Scott
v. State, 85 Okla. Crim. 213, 186 P.2d 336 (1947).
' The following states, by statute, have raised the age required of females at
common law contract a valid mairiage by 1, 2, and 3 years respectively: N.H.
Rev. Laws ch. 338, § 4 (1942); Ga. Code tit. 53, § 1o2 (1933); Okla. Stat. tit. 43, § 3
(1951)-
392 Ga. App. 88, 88 S.E.2d 3o6 (1955).
2Ga. Code tit. 53, § 102 (1933).
aN.H. Rev. Laws ch. 338, § 4 (1942). There are some jurisdictions which hold
a marriage involving parties above the common law age of consent but below the
legal age of consent to be entirely valid. These jurisdictions, however, are in the
minority. Parton v. Hervey, 67 Mass. (1 Gray) 119 (1854); Hunt v. Hunt, 172 Miss.
732, 161 So. 119 (1935); State v. Ward, 204 S.C. 210, 28 S.E.2d 785 (1944); State
v. Sellers, 140 S.C. 66, 134 S.E. 873 (1926).
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